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entitled to withhold an asset owned by the debtor until the latter re-
pays his debts. The creditor will gain priority over other creditors,
even creditors that hold security interests over the same property that
were perfected prior to his possession. This Article examines the cur-
rent available justifications for the preferred position of possessory
lien holders in bankruptcy. This Article shows that none of the prop-
erty-law-based arguments explored is persuasive when the debtor is
insolvent, as they are not coherent with other legal institutions and
principles in bankruptcy. Instead, the analysis presented offers a con-
tract-based approach to possessory liens, one that is founded on con-
tractual logic and doctrines. Finally, the implications of this
innovative perspective of executory contracts are shortly explored by
examining the way they correspond with the law governing executory
contracts. A legal arrangement that will more efficiently balance the
parties involved is offered.
I. INTRODUCTION
Insolvency uncovers multiple issues that need to be resolved. One
of bankruptcy procedure's most prominent roles is distributing the es-
tate' between the different claimants. It is probably the hardest one
to execute as well. Bankruptcy procedures aim to offer a solution for
an economic situation in which a debtor has more obligations than
assets,2 causing him to not pay those obligations when they are due. 3
The legal arrangement for this economic circumstance must therefore
create rules relating to the method in which creditors will be repaid
considering the insufficient assets available. The law indeed estab-
lished certain criteria by which creditors will be repaid in case their
debtor is insolvent. According to these rules, there will be occasions
in which it will depend on the nature of the creditor;4 however, other
times it will rely on the nature of the claim.
This Article focuses on the priority given to a creditor who holds
possessory liens. Under the laws governing possessory liens, a credi-
tor is entitled to withhold an asset owned by the debtor until the latter
fulfills his obligations to that creditor.5 Moreover, the possessory lien
1. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2006) (defining the debtor's estate).
2. A debtor is deemed insolvent when his debt obligations exceed the value of his assets. Id.
§ 101(32)(a) ("The term 'insolvent means' . . . [a] financial condition such that the sum of such
entity's debts is greater than all of such entity's property, at a fair valuation .... " ).
3. See id. § 303(h) (noting the conditions for commencement of an involuntary case against a
debtor).
4. For example, the fact that a creditor is an employee of the debtor may play a role in the
creditor's priority during the distribution process. See, e.g., id. § 507(a)(4)(A)-(B).
5. Possessory liens are a product of state law and thus vary between the states. See generally
Stephen E. Klein, Comment, The Constitutionality of Garagemen's Liens, 5 U. TOL. L. REV. 311
(1974).
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creditor's claim has priority over secured and non-secured creditors
who have interests over the same asset. Most of the objections to pos-
sessory liens in bankruptcy focus on the procedural aspect, namely
that these liens enable the possessory lien creditor to detain the asset
without judicial inquiry as to the validity of the creditor's claim. Op-
ponents argue that it undermines due process, a principle protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution,6 because the debtor
does not have any opportunity to object to the possessory lien credi-
tor's seizure of the asset or even to receive prior notice.
This Article will not analyze these procedural issues. Rather, it will
focus on substantial, different issues that are often neglected when dis-
cussing possessory liens. Although the lack of academic research in
this area is quite surprising and rather unusual, this Article aims to
challenge the available theoretical justifications for this property right
while offering a new justification. Bear in mind that a new justifica-
tion, if available, may or may not lead to modifying possessory liens'
position in bankruptcy, for the right should be shaped according to the
rationales underlining it. Hence it is important to note that the discus-
sion is not only about the priority rule in bankruptcy, but also, first
and foremost, on the normative issue: the basis of the right to with-
hold another person's property, if such exists. The priority rule will be
derived from the normative justification given.7
As this Article's analysis will show, contractual reasoning is the
most convincing justification for a creditor's right to withhold a
debtor's asset. Examining this right as an integral part of the contrac-
tual relationship between the parties allows us to view it from a new
perspective, which unfolds several economic and practical implica-
tions as discussed below. Furthermore, the analysis will explore the
correlation between the central method of dealing with contracts in
bankruptcy, namely by assuming or rejecting an executory contract,
and the case of possessory liens. The application of bankruptcy law's
6. See, e.g., N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 613 (1975); Mitchell v. W. T.
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 607-11 (1974) (noting the Supreme Court's judgments in which it enun-
ciated some due process guidelines regarding a creditor's prejudgment remedies such as posses-
sory liens); Klein, supra note 5, at 311. For an analysis of these cases and others similar to them,
see Doug Rendleman, Analyzing the Debtor's Due Process Interest, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 35,
39 (1975), and see generally John P. Ward, The Constitutional Validity of Mechanics' Liens
Under the Due Process Clause-A Reexamination After Mitchell and North Georgia, 55 B.U. L.
REV. 263 (1975).
7. Property rights and obligatory rights receive, in general, different treatment in bankruptcy,
and so the basis of the right may have a great impact on its priority ranking. On the distinction
between property and obligatory rules, see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089
(1972).
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legal arrangements reveals the unique features of a contractual rela-
tionship in which the right to withhold property is relevant. Most of
all, it exposes a problem of externalization by each party to the con-
tract. Based on the analysis presented, this Article urges to reshape
the legal arrangement governing possessory liens and suggests a
model that corresponds with principles of bankruptcy law, complies
with its goals, and manages to mitigate concerns stemming from ineffi-
cient behavior.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II briefly presents the current
legal arrangement of possessory liens, both within and outside of
bankruptcy proceedings. Part III examines the rationales for posses-
sory liens and points to their problems and limited persuasion. Part
IV follows with an alternative, normative, and contract-based justifi-
cation that is distinct from the common and historically accepted
property perspective. Part V analyzes the implications of the new ap-
proach in bankruptcy proceedings while drawing upon the current
method by which the law handles contractual relationships and apply-
ing that method to possessory liens. Part VI briefly concludes.
II. POSSESSORY LIENS AND THE CURRENT LEGAL ARRANGEMENT
A. Generally
Possessory liens8 are liens made valid by possession of a debtor's
property. 9 The creditor's possession of the property is intended to re-
sult in repayment of the debt owed by the owner of the property,
often a debtor.'0 The law recognizes different types of liens in which
possession of the property triggers the right of the possessory lien
creditor. Therefore, in this Article, possessory lien is a generic term
that encompasses various and more specific types of liens, such as arti-
san's liens and innkeeper's liens. These liens, as their names indicate,
8. Specific types of possessory liens are named after the profession of the creditor for whom
the right is granted. See RAY ANDREws BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 508 (2d ed.
1955) (noting that there are artisan's liens, garagemen's liens, bailee's liens, warehouseman liens,
and more). In addition, early on, in order to ensure that they received their payment on behalf
of the lodging and food they supplied, inkeepers used innkeeper's liens, usually taking posses-
sion of guests' luggage. See 2 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY
873 (1965).
9. The type of property subject to these liens may include agriculture, ships, cars, animals, and
more. See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3061.5 (West 2007) (discussing agricultural laborer's liens);
N.Y. LIEN LAw § 184 (McKinney 1999) (discussing liens of bailee motor vehicles, motor boats,
and aircrafts); Id. § 183 (discussing liens of bailee of animals).
10. See 1 LEONARD A. JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LIENS: COMMON LAw, STATU-
TORY, EOUITABLE, AND MARITIME § 3 (3d ed. 1914) (defining the lien as the "right of one in
possession of personality to hold it . . . for the satisfaction of a claim due from the owner").
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refer to a creditor of a particular profession for which the right was
originally established.
The right to withhold another person's property until the debt is
repaid was acknowledged early in history by the common law.1' Orig-
inally, the right was created to provide a person, who invested work
and effort to improve his fellow's property, with a remedy for when
the owner of that property neglected to pay what he owed.12 That
person then became a creditor and was allowed to retain the asset
until the debtor discharged his outstanding debt.13 The right is non-
consensual and does not require an agreement between the parties to
become enforceable. Today, different laws entitle a possessory lien
creditor to hold an asset against a debt he is owed.14 Although this is
a state-law right, each state has adopted its use with minimal variation
between the states.' 5
Section 9-333 of the Uniform Commercial Code states the general
legal recognition of the modern possessory lien:
§ 9-333. Priority of Certain Liens Arising by Operation of Law
(a) ["Possessory lien."] In this section, "possessory lien" means an
interest, other than a security interest or an agricultural lien:
(1) which secures payment or performance of an obligation for ser-
vices or materials furnished with respect to goods by a person in the
ordinary course of the person's business;
(2) which is created by statute or rule of law in favor of the person;
and
(3) whose effectiveness depends on the person's possession of the
goods.
(b) [Priority of possessory lien.] A possessory lien on goods has
priority over a security interest in the goods unless the lien is cre-
ated by a statute that expressly provides otherwise.16
Section 9-333 does not create the right itself; rather, it states that
where a possessory lien exists, either by state law or common law, it
will be classified as a property right in favor of the creditor who holds
11. See John C. Hogan, The Innkeeper's Lien at Common Law, 8 HASTINGS L.J. 33, 43 (1956)
(noting that the right was established around the 15th century); see also M'Intyre v. Carver, 2
Watts. & Serg. 392, 395 (Pa. 1841) ("It is not to be doubted that the law of particular or specific
lien on goods in the hands of a tradesman or artisan for the price of work done on them, though
there is no trace of its recognition in our own books, was brought hither by our ancestors; and
that it is a part of our common law.").
12. See BROWN, supra note 8, at 510.
13. See GERARD MCCORMACK, SECURED CREDIT UNDER ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAw 44
(2004).
14. See supra note 9.
15. See, e.g., 75 N.Y. JUR. 2D Liens § 11 (2012).
16. U.C.C. § 9-333 (2001).
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the property.17 For the possessory lien creditor to establish this right,
the creditor must gain possession over the debtor's asset as part of
their relationship.' Holding the property serves as a guarantee if the
debtor does not fulfill his contractual obligations. A possessory lien is
thus an individual remedy, one that is not dependent upon the courts,
a specific authorization by law, or the other party.19
The question of when a possessory lien creditor acquires the right to
continue holding a debtor's asset, thereby establishing his security
right, is a matter decided by law. Historically, this privilege dealt with
circumstances in which it was common that the creditor rendered ser-
vices prior to the debtor's payment. And once rendered, the creditor
was left with few methods by which the creditor could secure
payment.
Possessing the property is a prerequisite to realizing an interest in
the collateral. This occurs when the debtor fails to pay or complete
his obligation for the creditors, i.e. when the debtor defaults. Thus, in
a way, the debtor's default transforms the asset from property that is
merely held by a possessory lien creditor for a limited period of time
into a security.
The creditors' right has several main features. First, as mentioned
before, it grants the possessory lien creditor the right to withhold the
debtor's property. This right is valid even if, according to the parties'
agreement, the possessory lien creditor is supposed to return the asset
to the debtor-when the agreement specifies a date at which the prop-
erty is due. The creditor has the right to retain the asset until the
debtor fulfills the debtor's obligation. 20 In essence, the possessory lien
17. See Walter W. Miller, Jr., Liens Created by Operation of Law: A Look at Section 9-310 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 76 COM. L.J. 221, 221 (1971).
18. As a general rule, the asset needs to attach to a specific debt. See Oxxford Clothes XX,
Inc. v. Expeditors Int'l of Wash., Inc., No. 94 C 7734, 1996 WL 732523, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18,
1996), affd, 127 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 1997); Deitchman v. Korach, 71 N.E.2d 367, 369 (Ill. App. Ct.
1947). According to section 62 of the Restatement of Security, general possessory liens are lim-
ited to factors, attorneys, and bankers. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF SECURITY § 62 (1941).
19. A debate developed among the courts on the question of whether using the possessory
right undermines principles of due process, originating from the fact that the possessory lien
creditor is entitled to hold the asset and sometimes sell it through a public sale without a judicial
hearing on opposing claims. See William C. Brown, The Due Process Challenge to Possessory
Lien Enforcement, 10 TULSA L.J. 415, 415 (1975); Note, Possessory Liens: The Need for Separate
Due Process Analysis, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 971, 975 (1975) (analyzing the issue while refer-
ring to the two important rulings of Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), and Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337 (1969)).
20. See, e.g., Gordon v. Sullivan, 188 F.2d 980, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1951) ("[A] person in possession
of property under a lien is the owner of it against all the world and even against the actual owner
until his claim is paid; and no one, not even the actual owner, has any right to disturb his posses-
sion, without previous payment of such claim." (quoting Brown v. Petersen, 25 App. D.C. 359,
363 (D.C. Cir. 1905)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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gives the creditor a method of pressuring the debtor, assuming the
latter wants his asset returned. The creditor's right is limited to hold-
ing the asset and does not normally extend to its sale and collection of
the sale's proceeds, though in some cases the law grants specific types
of possessory lien creditors the right to do so. 2 1 In many circum-
stances, the creditor will be eligible to retain the asset as a means of
forcing the debtor to pay without the option of selling the asset.22 It
follows that if for some reason the debtor is not interested in re-
claiming the asset, the creditor will need to file a debt claim, similar to
creditors without a security interest. That differentiates possessory
lien creditors from creditors holding other types of security interests
where they are entitled to receive proceeds from its disposition.23
Second, a possessory lien creditor is a secured creditor, therefore
giving him priority over other creditors of the debtor. The creditor
will not only gain priority over unsecured creditors but also be pre-
ferred over other secured creditors holding security interests over the
same asset. 24 This privilege entitles the possessory lien creditor to
possess the debtor's property, even if another creditor perfected a se-
curity interest in the collateral before the possessory lien creditor took
possession.25 As such, the legal arrangement of possessory liens
serves as an exception to the basic rule that applies to priorities be-
tween secured creditors.
Generally, priorities between secured creditors who have interests
in the same collateral will be determined based on the timing of filing
or perfection.26 Security interests are, in essence, "first in time, first
in right." The first creditor to perfect a security interest will usually
have priority over others who have security interests in the same prop-
erty. With possessory liens, however, it does not matter if a security
interest was filed or perfected over the same asset before the creditor
21. See, e.g., Parks v. "Mr. Ford," 556 F.2d 132, 134, 142-43 (3d Cir. 1977) ("We believe that
the Pennsylvania statutes under which a repairman may sell a customer's motor vehicle to satisfy
his common-law lien do not meet the due process requirements articulated by the Supreme
Court." (citation omitted)); see also Adams v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 520 P.2d 961, 967-68
(Cal. 1974) (declaring that the owner is denied due process when a creditor sells his vehicle
without the owner's consent, but the creditor's detention of the vehicle does not).
22. See generally Adams, 520 P.2d 961.
23. See U.C.C. §§ 9-306, 9-502 (2001).
24. Holders of possessory liens will also be favored over creditors with purchase-money se-
curity interests. See, e.g., Phila. Nat'l Bank v. K & G Speed Assocs., 43 Pa. D. & C.2d 241, 243
(Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1967).
25. Security laws are a product of state law, and yet the states acknowledge the priority given
to the possessory lien creditor through direct legislation and application of the common law.
See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 52-201 (2012); Mfrs. Acceptance Corp. v. Gibson, 422 S.W.2d 435,
437 (Tenn. 1967).
26. See U.C.C. §§ 9-308 to 9-316.
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took hold of it. Regardless of the other security interests attached to
the asset, a possessory lien creditor will still maintain the right to hold
the asset and wait to collect the money that the debtor owes.
Third, possessory liens are established by and dependent on physi-
cal possession of the property.27 If the possessory lien creditor does
not physically hold the asset,28 or if for some reason the creditor yields
the asset,29 his rights to the asset cease to exist.30 Therefore, the cred-
itor will neither be able to repossess the asset nor be entitled to repay-
ment as a secured creditor.31 The physical aspect is not just one
component but rather an essential one.32
Fourth, the value of the asset held and the amount of debt owed do
not have to match or even be proportional. To demonstrate, an asset
worth $1,000 and the outstanding debt valued at $100 does not de-
prive the creditor's possession of the asset. Such circumstances may
occur if, for example, the creditor is contracted to fix machines for a
manufacturer, and to perform his part of the agreement, the contrac-
tor moves the machines to his place of business. Presumably, such
27. Also, in some cases, courts have held that the possessory lien creditor should hold not only
the property but also the physical and material work made, as opposed to intangible property.
See, e.g., Monach Air Serv., Inc. v. Solow (In re Midway Airlines, Inc.), 383 F.3d 663, 672-73 (7th
Cir. 2004) (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF SECUIUTY § 61 (1941)).
28. So will be the case, for example, if a third party held the asset. See generally Hutchison v.
C.I.T. Corp., 726 F.2d 300, 302 (6th Cir. 1984).
29. See, e.g., Leonard v. Dahlke Trailer Sales & Leasing Co. (In re Express Fruit & Produce,
Inc.), 16 B.R. 366, 368 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1982), affd, No. 4-82-103, 1982 WL 171055 (D. Minn.
Aug. 4,1982). A creditor who lost possession without his consent, for example, by force or fraud
does not yield his rights. See, e.g., Brannon v. Gay (In re Browy), 527 F.2d 799, 800-02 (7th Cir.
1976). In such cases, the creditor will still be regarded as holding the property and having prior-
ity over the other creditors. See id. Conversely, the creditor can release the asset from his
possession under an agreement between him and the trustee that states the creditor will receive
the proceeds of the sale from the asset or after receiving adequate security in exchange without
jeopardizing his priority right. Id.
30. This can be learned from the words in section 9-333 mentioned above that gives priority
depending "on the person's possession of the goods." U.C.C. § 9-333(a)(3); see also Hayden v.
Wells (In re Heyden), 308 B.R. 428, 434 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004) ("[Allthough not specifically
stated in the statute, possession is necessary for the lien to retain its priority . . .. Possession is
the only mechanism available to ensure satisfaction of the lien.") (referring to a statute in Wash-
ington establishing a mechanic's possessory lien); In re Winnett, 97 B.R. 7, 9-10 (Bankr. E.D.
Cal. 1989) (regarding California's right of an attorney to possess his client's funds).
31. See, e.g., Robinson Bros. Motor Co. v. Knight, 288 S.W. 725, 725 (Tenn. 1926). But see
Thorp Commercial Corp. v. Miss. Rd. Supply Co., 348 So. 2d 1016,1017-18 (Miss. 1977) (declar-
ing the validity of an artisan's lien even though the creditor had given up possession of the
property at one point but held the property at the time he was claiming his superiority over a
perfected security interest).
32. Physical possession is an essential component unless there was an agreement between the
parties that the creditor will give up his possession of the asset but will not give up his secured
right over the proceeds. For such a claim, see In re Midway Airlines, Inc., 383 F.3d at 671-73
(dismissing the claim).
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machines are worth far more than what the creditor's service is worth.
Nevertheless, the creditor may possess the machines until his debt is
satisfied.
After examining the possessory lien's legal arrangement and the
main characteristics of the right, Part II(B) will explore how these
types of claims affect bankruptcy proceedings and how possessory
liens function when the debtor is insolvent.
B. Possessory Liens and Bankruptcy
A possessory lien grants the creditor holding it a two-fold right.
First, the lien affects the relationship between the debtor and the cred-
itor, and clarifies the rights and obligations of each party following the
creditor's possession of the property. Second, the possessory lien is a
property right33 given to the creditor, and as such, it influences the
relationship between the creditor and the debtor's other creditors, if
any. Therefore, the main issue is whether bankruptcy law should
change the possessory lien law's approach towards each of these as-
pects, as well as the balance between them.
One might claim that the first aspect, as mentioned above, is irrele-
vant once the debtor becomes insolvent. The debtor's interest in the
property should no longer be the focus of the legal arrangement;
rather, the focus should be on the second aspect, i.e. the creditor's
relationships with the debtor's other creditors. Once the debtor does
not have enough assets to repay his debts in full, the main battle over
the assets, as well as which creditors have rights to them, is the battle
between the creditors. Accordingly, acknowledging the right, or not,
will not often affect the debtor but the rest of the creditors. It is a
matter of simple mathematics. If the creditor is allowed to hold the
property until the payment is made and thus is repaid prior to the
other creditors, less will be available to the other creditors. If the pos-
sessory lien creditor is not allowed to pressure the debtor into repay-
ing him, then the possessory lien creditor will be repaid on a pro rata
basis like the rest of the unsecured creditors. 34 Therefore, the un-
secured creditors' share from the debtor's pool of assets will be
greater, and so each will receive a higher percentage of its claim.
Although the most apparent and perhaps the most important effect
is on the creditors, there may be situations in which recognizing the
33. For a discussion on the difference between property and liability rules, see Calabresi &
Melamed, supra note 7.
34. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (2006) (outlining the distribution of the property of a debtor's
estate); Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 29 (1952) (noting that the bankruptcy law is based on
equality of distribution); see also H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 9, 19 (1973).
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possessory lien creditor's right to withhold the asset may jeopardize
the debtor's reorganization efforts. Sometimes, the assets withheld
are so essential to the debtor's business that his inability to use or sell
them will damage his efforts to get the business back on track. This
situation may arise if, for example, the asset in question is a machine
that is essential for a factory's operations or the possessory lien credi-
tor withholds a factory's products. The possessory lien creditor's right
prevents the debtor from selling or using the assets to improve or, at
least, sustain income. Under these circumstances, the rules applying
to the relationship between the debtor and the creditor may have sig-
nificant outcomes.
The ultimate goal of bankruptcy remains maximizing utility on be-
half of the creditors, not the debtor.35 Furthermore, many scholars of
law and economic literature who analyze bankruptcy law assert that
efforts to rehabilitate the debtor should not be at the expense of the
creditors.36 This Article makes this assumption and holds that any le-
gal arrangement and privileges given to creditors should be based on
both the effect to creditors and the goal to protect their interests over
those of the debtor.
The next part focuses on the possible rationales for possessory liens'
legal arrangement. As noted before, sparse academic work has been
done to thoroughly examine the normative arguments supporting or
opposing possessory liens.
III. QUESTIONING THE RATIONALES OF POSSESSORY
LIENS IN BANKRUPTCY
In order to decide whether a possessory lien's legal arrangement is
justifiable in bankruptcy, it is necessary to first examine the rationales
supporting that arrangement. However, the courts and academics
have made little progress in this area of law. This part examines and
investigates four explanations that support possessory liens' legal ar-
35. Commentators often mention this argument as one of the main criticisms of Chapter 11.
See generally Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 69
(2004); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 775 (1988).
36. This view comes from the opinion that bankruptcy law is a procedural, technical field of
law, which aims to function as a debt collection mechanism. Hence, it should not redistribute
rights established before bankruptcy, nor should it alter them. Since Chapter 11 routinely causes
such deviations from the prior bankruptcy entitlements, this view led to opposing Chapter 11.
See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 35; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, Bargaining and the
Division of Value in Corporate Reorganization, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 253 (1992).
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rangement in bankruptcy. 37 Some have been previously mentioned
and, to some extent, analyzed, while others can only be implied from
previous discussions. This Article's aim here is to demonstrate that
while these explanations may seem appealing when applied in a
nonbankruptcy setting, each loses much of its appeal when examined
under the realities of insolvency. Each argument is presented and
then followed by a critique on its relevance and its ability to justify
this preference.
A. Enhancing the Value of the Property
The first argument that supports the legal recognition of possessory
liens' preferred status in bankruptcy is that the possessory lien credi-
tor's actions improve the asset and enhance its value, entitling the
creditor to continue holding the asset until the creditor is paid.38 Be-
cause the possessory lien creditor invests his efforts, talent, and mater-
ials in the asset, ultimately resulting in the asset's higher value, the
creditor should be entitled to keep it until the debtor pays the creditor
for his work.39 If the possessory lien creditor is not given priority over
secured creditors, the creditor will have improved the secured credi-
tors' chances for repayment while not gaining anything as a result.40
The common law of some states requires that a possessory lien cred-
itor's service must enhance the value of the asset to obtain possessory
lien privileges. 41 This perhaps implies that enhancing the market
value of the asset is the motive for the possessory lien creditor's prior-
ity. Nevertheless, the value does not have to be represented through
the market price.42 Consequently, the right has been extended to situ-
ations where the possessory lien creditor's actions did not necessarily
37. Indeed, some of these explanations that are mentioned in other legal systems, such as the
Israeli system, acknowledge the right of a creditor to continue holding the debtor's property in
some circumstances. See CA 790/85 Isr. Airport Auth. v. Gross 44(3) PD 185 [1990] (Isr.).
38. See, e.g., Stewart v. Flowers, 44 Miss. 513, 517-18 (1870).
39. See BROWN, supra note 8, at 511 ("[H]e who by labor, skill, or materials adds value to the
chattel of another whether under an express or an implied agreement has a possessory lien
thereon for the value of his services and may retain the chattel in his possession until the same
be paid.").
40. See Dean Powell, Priorities Between Article Nine Security Interests and Statutory Liens in
Iowa, 23 DRAKE L. REV. 169, 170-71 (1973).
41. See, e.g., Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1287 (7th Cir. 1985) (not-
ing that "a lien is ... a device for preventing unjust enrichment").
42. See, e.g., Chi. Great W. R.R. v. Am. McKenna Process Co., 200 Ill. App. 166, 172 (1916);
see also Donald Wise Huffman, Enhancement of Value as Element ofArtisan's Lien, 20 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 391, 394-95 (1963).
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reflect a price increase of the property.43 However, the formal legal
requirement reflects that there must be some relationship between the
purposes and the economic results of the transaction, i.e. the increase
in the asset's value. This relationship is addressed in the following
paragraphs.
This Article posits that there are three central problems with the
value enhancement argument. First, the argument does not entirely
comply with other instances where the law favors creditors. Indeed,
as mentioned before, the equality between a claim's value and the as-
sociated asset's value is not a definite principle. 44 It is a principle that
is expressed by treating analogous claims similarly.4 5 Following this
reasoning, one might claim that a creditor who improved a debtor's
asset holds a different status than other creditors who did nothing to
improve the asset's value. As such, the possessory lien creditor earns
the right to repayment before other creditors that did not improve the
asset's value. In fact, there are other situations where the law favors
parties who contributed to a business and enhanced its value. 46 How-
ever, this Article argues that these circumstances are usually dedi-
cated to a value increasing activity made during the bankruptcy
process and not before it.
Take, for example, the preferred status of a contractual party with
which the debtor assumed a contract. 47 The debtor bases his decision
on the economic value attached to the specific contract. The debtor
will assume a contract if he believes it will benefit him and thus the
rest of the creditors. According to the Bankruptcy Code, a party to
such a contract will be paid in full if the debtor assumes the contract. 48
Otherwise, if it does not contribute to the debtor's position or is bur-
43. This argument is somewhat related to the justice and fairness arguments examined in Part
III(B). If a creditor contributed to an asset's value, it seems unfair that his monetary claim will
be left unsatisfied while other creditors' claims will benefit from his actions.
44. See supra Part II(A).
45. Indeed, this is considered to be the core concept of formal equality. See Donna
Greschner, Does Law Advance the Cause of Equality?, 27 QUEEN's L.J. 299, 302-03 (2001).
46. This could be the rationale for the preferred priority of purchase-money security interests,
for example. On this type of security interest, see infra note 70. So too for the status of debtor-
in-possession financing or post-petition financing, in which lenders finance Chapter 11 and gain
preferred ranking as secured creditors, and frequently even to have a super-priority over other
secured interests. See 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2006).
47. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 365 (outlining the ability to accept or reject executory contracts
and expired leases).
48. Either the debtor-in-possession under Chapter 11 reorganization or the trustee under
Chapter 7 liquidation has the right to assume or reject a contract. Id. § 365(a).
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densome to it,49 the debtor will reject the contract. The debtor exam-
ines the benefit or lack thereof through the lens of the debtor's
current condition and the potential to benefit the debtor's creditors.
Unlike the grant of a possessory lien preference in bankruptcy, the
debtor will not make his decision to assume a contract based on the
value the contract added in the past. Hence, the debtor may reject the
party's contract even though it was beneficial in the past.50 In addi-
tion, the creditor of the rejected contract becomes an unsecured credi-
tor and thus is left with only a limited likelihood that his claim will be
repaid in bankruptcy.
In many cases, perhaps even in the majority of them, a debtor may
have benefited from a transaction or a relationship the debtor initi-
ated prior to bankruptcy. The value of the debtor, as opposed to a
specific asset of the debtor, may increase as a result of the bargain. In
fact, this is practically one of the basic assumptions underlying the ec-
onomic analysis of contract law: that people act rationally in a way
that will maximize their utility. And yet, none of these creditors will
necessarily gain priority over others because of the mentioned, or
rather assumed, increase in value. The question is, therefore, why
should the law treat a possessory lien creditor differently? This pos-
sessory lien creditor's claim, like his fellow creditors' claims, benefited
the debtor before the debtor filed for bankruptcy. The argument's
reliance on a previously created benefit seems weak, especially when
individually examined.
Second, the value enhancement argument for possessory liens does
not validate a possessory lien creditor's right to hold the asset. In
other words, it neglects to explain why a possessory lien creditor
should get priority over creditors that have enhanced the value of the
debtor's asset without possession being an integral part of the transac-
tion. Why should physical possession, an opportunity that parties may
claim as merely circumstantial, decide the creditor's fate? It is possi-
ble that a creditor worked on the debtor's asset and enhanced its
value, but did so without gaining physical possession of it. Such a sce-
nario may occur if, for example, the contractor from the previous ex-
ample could have fixed the debtor's machines in the debtor's factory
49. See Morris G. Shanker, The Treatment of Executory Contracts and Leases in the 1978
Bankruptcy Code, PRAC. LAw., Oct. 15, 1979, at 11, 20 (citing John J. Creedon & Robert M.
Zinman, Landlord's Bankruptcy: Laissez Les Lessees, 26 Bus. LAw. 1391 (1971)).
50. Debtors sometimes have to reject contracts even though they will be beneficial in the
future. This may occur if they have limited financial means and have to grade the contracts to
which they are bound on their economic implications. If the debtors are in bankruptcy, espe-
cially Chapter 7 bankruptcy, or decide to focus solely on certain fields or markets-a likely
scenario in Chapter 11-they lack the practical ability to complete their obligations.
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and added the same value to the machines. Although the creditor's
improvements allowed the debtor to continue operating his business
and increased the contractor's chances of repayment, bankruptcy law
would not grant the contractor special privileges or priority like a pos-
sessory lien. He obviously will not be paid prior to a creditor who had
a security interest in the improved machines. In this case, how can
value enhancement supporters claim that enhancing the value of a
debtor's asset is a viable rationale for possessory liens preferential
treatment in bankruptcy? If the value enhancement argument sup-
ported the possessory lien creditor's priority in bankruptcy, then any
improvements that a creditor made to a debtor's assets would have
given that creditor priority and rights over other creditors. However,
it seems difficult to prioritize claims of a creditor that provides a bene-
fit in a transaction that involves only his possession of the debtor's
asset. Meaning, in order for the value enhancement argument to be
valid, it is necessary to show the difference between this type of trans-
action and the other transactions in which the work enhances the
value of a debtor's asset while the debtor still maintains possession. In
other words, what is the efficiency of a transaction with a possessory
lien creditor compared to any other? Is there something intrinsically
beneficial when it comes to transactions in which the possessory lien
creditor possesses the debtor's property in the course of performing
the contract?
Third, the value enhancement argument also does not comply with
the goals of bankruptcy law as perceived by either economic analysis
supporters or those that hold fair distribution as its principal goal.
Under the economic analysis approach, two intertwined objectives un-
derlie bankruptcy law. The first is minimizing the cost of credit for
legal entities, especially law firms because they encompass the vast
majority of economic activity.51 As parties consider the risks associ-
ated with entering into a contract with one another, they also consider
the risks of default due to insolvency. An efficient bankruptcy law-
one that minimizes the costs associated with bankruptcy proceed-
ings-will lower transaction costs prior to entering the relationship.
Because lower risks entail lower costs, credit costs will decrease, and
parties will execute more efficient transactions. The second goal,
which has a direct connection to the first, is to maximize the returns
51. That is the reason a market for firms was created, both nationally and globally. States and
governments around the world compete with each other, targeting corporations and businesses
to encourage them to incorporate and do business in their territory. Tax reductions for busi-
nesses are one major way of doing so. See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax
Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (2000).
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for the creditors of the debtor once the debtor becomes insolvent. 52
Bankruptcy law should present a system in which inefficient relation-
ships cease to exist, while efficient ones remain, in order to maximize
the payoffs creditors collect.
Considering the second economic goal, there seems to be no appar-
ent benefit gained from a legal arrangement that gives priority to a
possessory lien creditor who holds a debtor's asset. 53 Bankruptcy will
not maximize the creditor's return because the debtor's asset gained
value before he became insolvent. In other words, granting a posses-
sory lien creditor this right, it could be said, will not enlarge the pie or
the estate because the debtor received the benefit of the bargain
before entering bankruptcy.
Furthermore, the value enhancement argument has explicit distri-
butional and societal implications. A possessory lien transfers wealth
from either the secured creditor to the possessory lien creditor or the
general creditors to the possessory lien creditor. Possessory liens un-
dermine the principle of equality of distribution; as claimed earlier,
this deviation does not lie on solid grounds.54 The value enhancement
argument itself does not explain why a possessory lien creditor should
receive such privilege because the value enhancement argument does
not differentiate a possessory lien creditor from other creditors whose
actions have benefited the debtor. In order to justify deviations from
the equality principle, one needs to show why it is necessary to give
more protection to certain types of creditors as opposed to other
types. A similar claim is sometimes mentioned with regards to tort
creditors55 or employees, 56 for example.
In sum, the value enhancement argument does not support a pos-
sessory lien creditor's right to withhold the debtor's asset until the
debtor repays his debt, particularly when it stands as the sole one.
52. The modern yet classical economic analysis of bankruptcy law developed from the seminal
work of Thomas Jackson. See Alan Schwartz, A Normative Theory of Business Bankruptcy, 91
VA. L. REV. 1199, 1217-18 (2005) (discussing the economic efficiency goals of bankruptcy law).
See generally THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAw (1986) (ex-
plaining the roles and policy of bankruptcy law).
53. This Article examines the first objective of the economic analysis in Part IV(B).
54. See supra Part Ill(A).
55. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured
Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 882-84 (1996) (supporting preferences for tort credi-
tors based on economic analysis).
56. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3)-(4) (2006) (noting the priority of the employers); United
States v. Embassy Rest., Inc., 359 U.S. 29, 33-34 (1959); see also Donald R. Korobkin, Employee
Interests in Bankruptcy, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5 (1996); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy
Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 788 (1987) ("Congress .. . accepted the idea that bankruptcy
serves to protect interests that have no other protection. The older employee, the regular cus-
tomer . . . .").
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B. Justice and Fairness
A leading argument in favor of possessory liens' preferred ranking
is the justice and fairness argument. The argument provides that a
possessory lien creditor's right to hold a debtor's asset until the debtor
pays the creditor promotes justice and fairness between the parties
involved.57 It also supports the idea that it is only fair to let the credi-
tor continue holding the asset in which the possessory lien creditor
invested work, material, and effort to improve its value on behalf of
the debtor. From an equity point of view, it is not reasonable to de-
mand that a possessory lien creditor return the property to the debtor
when the debtor himself does not comply with the terms of the agree-
ment.58 A possessory lien creditor does not have many other means
to help collect the debt he is owed. In fact, it is assumed that denying
the creditor of the right will almost inevitably leave the possessory lien
creditor in a hopeless position.
But whereas these arguments make perfect sense when the debtor
is solvent, they may seem flawed when the debtor is insolvent. Focus-
ing solely on the relationship between the two parties, and how to
advance fairness within it, appears problematic when, in fact, the
debtor is not the only party in the picture, perhaps a less important
party. It may still be held that justice between the specific parties to
the transaction will be enhanced, but once one of them is insolvent,
this relationship cannot be analyzed separately from relationships
with other creditors. The possessory lien creditor does not compete
with only the debtor over the asset, as he did before; he also competes
with the other creditors that have legitimate claims against the
debtor's asset and the rest of his estate.59 The impact of granting the
possessory lien creditor the right to continue holding a debtor's asset
and preference over other creditors' claims should not be examined as
if the debtor was solvent. Furthermore, it is necessary to examine the
possessory lien creditor's relationship not as an independent one but
as one that is interlocked with other relationships of which the debtor
is a part.60
57. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Colwell Diesel Serv. & Garage, Inc., 302 A.2d
595, 596-97 (Me. 1973) (stating that the reasons for acknowledging possessory liens are justice
and commercial necessity).
58. This argument is also connected to the human instincts and the tendency of the law to
sometimes acknowledge them. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 168 (1963)
(explaining that the law must base itself on actual human interaction, and not philosophy, to
maintain societal equity).
59. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (noting the potential claimants of a debtor's estate).
60. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 56, at 790-93 (explaining a non-exhaustive list of distribu-
tional priorities).
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Even if the wide held view that possessory liens promote justice
between the parties to the original transaction is accepted, the ques-
tion of whether they promote justice between the creditors themselves
must still be addressed. Possessory liens give the possessory lien cred-
itor the chance to collect his debt before the other secured and un-
secured creditors. Obviously, the other creditors will be negatively
affected because they will likely collect less than what they were origi-
nally owed had bankruptcy law not acknowledged a possessory lien's
priority. A state of insolvency is defined as a situation where the
debtor does not have enough assets to pay his debts at the time they
are due.61 Therefore, complete repayment of a possessory lien credi-
tor's claim means a smaller piece of the debtor's estate for the remain-
ing creditors.
The mere fact that under a certain legal arrangement a possessory
lien creditor's portion of a debtor's estate will be larger than other
creditors' distributions is not a sufficient ground to determine that
there is a problem with a possessory lien's preference in bankruptcy.
However, it does mean that the justice and fairness argument should
be examined in a broader point of view than the reasoning offered for
the solvent debtor. In order to establish solid ground for preferring a
possessory lien creditor, it is necessary to establish a valid reason for
why protecting a possessory lien creditor promotes justice and fairness
more than protecting the debtor's other creditors. The next part ex-
amines whether a possessory lien and its original transaction offers an
explanation to support the need to secure the interests of a possessory
lien creditor.
C. Preserving and Improving the Commercial
Dynamic of the Marketplace
A possessory lien creditor's right to withhold an asset from a debtor
is a measure that enhances the fluency and dynamic of commerce in
the market.62 The claim is that if a possessory lien creditor did not
have this right, the creditor would not have any leverage to force the
debtor to repay his debt. The debtor would have already received his
benefit from the agreement, and if he were to default, he would do so
knowing that the only way a former possessory lien creditor could
force repayment is to file a lawsuit. Although there is a good chance
61. The "cash flow" or "equitable solvency" test determines whether the debtor has generally
ceased to pay debts in the ordinary course of business and is unable to pay them as they become
due. See J.B. Heaton, Solvency Tests, 62 Bus. LAW. 983, 988-91 (2007).
62. CA 790/85 Isr. Airport Auth. v. Gross 44(3) PD 185 [1990] (Isr.).
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the possessory lien creditor would win, especially if a written contract
existed, it would cost him both time and money.
Additionally, a possessory lien creditor may even refrain from suing
for the value of his claim either because he does not have the financial
resources or because its value is not enough to make litigation worth-
while. Thus, a possessory lien creditor would be reluctant to perform
the services for a debtor without making certain that he would be able
to collect the payment owed to him upon completion of the agree-
ment. If a possessory lien creditor did not have the right to hold a
debtor's asset, similar market transactions would transform into one
of three outcomes: (1) a possessory lien creditor will decide to not
enter into an agreement with the debtor; (2) a possessory lien creditor
will require a debtor to pay him before performing his service; or (3) a
possessory lien creditor will demand some kind of guarantee or collat-
eral from a debtor to protect him in case the debtor defaults. Any one
of these outcomes may yield inefficient transactions.
Without possessory liens, creditors would not enter into certain bar-
gains for fear that they would not be able to collect payment after
fulfilling their obligations. Each party may profit from a transaction,
but without possessory liens, certain transactions may leave both par-
ties in a worse condition because creditors may not recognize their
earnings without the security of possessing a debtor's asset. One pur-
pose of the law, contract law in particular, is to minimize such barriers
to contract and enable parties to agree to and perform efficient trans-
actions.63 The absence of a possessory lien may jeopardize efficient
transactions by increasing the uncertainty between parties that wish to
engage in such contracts.64
The other two results mentioned hold that the creditor will ask for
the payment upfront or require some type of security for the service
rendered. Neither method is necessarily an ideal transaction. Asking
for payment upfront burdens the other party and may negatively in-
fluence his willingness to participate in the bargain. Although the
risks associated with a transaction shift to the other side when a party
agrees to pay for a service in advance, the increased risk still exists
and the willingness to participate in the transaction has not changed; it
63. See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78
VA. L. REV. 821, 876 (1992) (discussing the consent theory to enforce the intentions of parties to
a contract); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law,
113 YALE L.J. 541, 545 (2003) (discussing efficiency problems that parties face when entering
into a contract).
64. On the role of uncertainty and the importance of minimizing the effect of it within con-
tract law, see Benjamin E. Hermalin, Avery W. Katz & Richard Craswell, Contract Law, in THE
HANDBOOK OF LAw & ECONOMICS (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
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has only been displaced. Therefore, the second outcome would result
in the exact same inefficiency as before; only this time, a debtor would
be reluctant to agree to a bargain.
As for the last type of solution, the problem is that it turns the
transaction from one that is or should be relatively easy and common,
as it applies to everyday life, to something that is far more compli-
cated and expensive. If the creditor wants some guarantee over the
payment, then more requirements must be fulfilled prior to executing
the contract. Sometimes, formal requirements need to be met,6 5
which takes time and, in some cases, money.66 Requiring a creditor to
take some other form of security will, once again, set barriers between
the parties instead of minimizing them and allowing parties to
transact.
By acknowledging the right to withhold the property until the debt
is fulfilled, the law creates certainty and enhances the trust between
the parties or, in other words, the ability to rely on one another. The
creditor knows that it will be easier for him to collect the debt later, so
he is willing to seal the deal much faster and at a lower price. Posses-
sory liens also withdraw from the party rendering the service the need
to make sure the asset does not have any prior claims. If the creditor
will have to check that before accepting the transaction, it will compli-
cate matters and again make the whole transaction more expensive.
The sorts of transactions contemplated here are not necessarily long-
term ones, and they are usually quite simple. Hence, it might not be
economically worthwhile to investigate the current security interests
in the property. In sum, possessory liens contribute to efficiency in
the market by reducing the risks associated with these types of
bargains.
This argument is indeed plausible. It is quite obvious that as more
risks are associated with a bargain, fewer parties will be inclined to
enter into it. The greater confidence parties have in gaining the final
outcome they desire through the contract, the more they will be ready
to contract with each other. This is the fundamental principle of con-
tract law. 67
The only challenge this argument raises is that it does not provide
an explanation why it is necessary, in these types of transactions, to
65. So too with liens, for example. See generally U.C.C. § 9-203(b) (1977) (specifying when a
security interest is enforceable).
66. Such fees include the issuance of a bank's guarantee. Also, when taking a security interest
in property, it is required to insure the property, which means more expenses associated with the
transaction.
67. See Hermalin, Katz & Craswell, supra note 64.
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provide the parties with this high level of protection. Obviously, there
are many other transactions in which the parties do not have complete
assurance that the transaction will be completed. Are transactions in-
volving asset transition inherently riskier to the parties involved than
others? That is quite doubtful. There is no reason to assume upfront
that in those transactions the party invested more effort, money or
any other resource in performing its obligations. Also, there is no rea-
son to assume that parties to those transactions will refrain from bar-
gaining or raise their price, whereas in other transactions for future
performance the parties will not act in the same way. One can even
claim that when parties to other unsecured transactions examine the
risks associated with their bargain, they will take into account the ad-
vantages given to possessory lien holders, as well as the impact upon
them, and raise prices accordingly.
And so this argument may give a solid, contract-law-based explana-
tion, but it does not resolve the question as to why the shift in posses-
sion of the property should raise the risks of the parties. The next part
will refer to the meaning of physical possession and try to analyze it
and its influence on supporting or dismissing the justifications for pos-
sessory liens.
D. Possession as a Signal for Entitlement
As noted before, neither the value enhancement explanation nor
the commercial requirement explanation can stand on its own.6 8 They
do not clarify why, in these particular circumstances, the possessory
lien creditor's contribution to the value of the asset should give the
creditor a preference over others, or why there is something unique
about these transactions that drives us to protect possessory lien credi-
tors. There are many other transactions in which the creditor's actions
and work have improved the value of the debtor's property. But no
one argues that a creditor should gain priority in every case in which
his actions enhanced the value of the debtor's assets. Thus, unless we
give the same advantages to every creditor who contributes to the
debtor's assets, enhancing the value is not, and cannot be, the sole
basis for possessory liens. Similarly, it is hard to understand the ratio-
nale for securing the rights of these creditors, as opposed to others
who may have been involved in other relatively simple and short-term
transactions for future performance.
68. See supra Parts III(A), (C).
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Moreover, as noted before,69 the possessory lien creditor enhanced
the asset's value in the cases referred to in this Article before the
debtor entered the bankruptcy process. Even if there is a tendency to
grant higher priority for a creditor who adds value to the estate, that
tendency usually does not extend to actions made before insolvency
occurred but rather to gains earned during bankruptcy proceedings. 70
This is so for a rather good reason. The ex post goal of bankruptcy
law is to maximize the returns for the creditors.7' It seems reasonable
that the law will encourage a creditor to act in a way that will promote
that goal. If that creditor will not receive higher priority, why would
he be willing to act at all? But this is not the case here. Here, the
creditor is rewarded for something he did in an earlier stage, when
bankruptcy had yet to occur.
To justify relying on any of the above-mentioned arguments one
must, therefore, differentiate between the possessory lien creditor and
other creditors. It appears that the central difference lies in the pos-
sessory lien creditor's ability to physically withhold the asset that the
creditor improved whereas others do not have that opportunity. This
difference has been mentioned in case law, though not as the basis of
the right, but as a component in its examination and recognition. 72
69. See supra Part III(A).
70. An exception to that rule could be seen in purchase-money security interests. These se-
curity interests have priority over floating charges, which typically include all of the debtor's
assets. Section 9-103(a) of the Uniform Commercial Code defines purchase-money security in-
terests. Section 9-324(a) of the Uniform Commercial Code states general priority of security
interests over other perfected security interests in the same collateral, while subsection (b) gives
a priority for purchase-money security interests in inventory. The reason for why the priority is
not identical to the case of possessory liens is that, with purchase-money security interests, the
assumption is that the collateral could not have been obtained by the debtor but for the credi-
tor's extension of value. That funding might have not been supplied if it was not for the pre-
ferred position that the creditor will have in case of financial distress. Since the law encourages
efficient projects, and sometimes funding is necessary in order to complete such projects, the law
grants the creditor who is willing to lend for the project superiority over other creditors. With
possessory liens, however, no one argues that, without the work, the property could not have
been purchased or owned by the debtor in the first place. Also, with purchase-money security
interests, the other creditors are not really deprived of the collateral since it was not the debtor's
property to begin with, and would not have been if not for the financing offered by that specific
creditor. On purchase-money security interests, see, for example, Grant Gilmore, The Purchase
Money Priority, 76 HARv. L. REV. 1333 (1963); Keith G. Meyer, A Primer on Purchase Money
Security Interests Under Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 50 U. KAN. L. REV.
143 (2001).
71. See Schwartz, supra note 52.
72. See, e.g., Peyton v. Farris (In re Farris), No. 93-6445, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 34136, at *12
(6th Cir. Dec. 1, 1994) ("Under the circumstances here, it is somewhat puzzling as to what else
Ingram could have done to make his possession more open, notorious, and complete. Thus,
there were circumstances that could put outside parties and creditors on notice that Ingram had
an interest in the inventory.").
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Is that a legitimate difference on which to base preferred ranking in
bankruptcy? In today's complex and dynamic economy, an asset's
value can be enhanced in ways other than possessing it or working on
it physically. The division between laborers and artisans who pos-
sessed the asset while improving it on behalf of the debtor, and other
service providers who did not, seems arbitrary and unjustifiable in the
modern world. Indeed, throughout history, physical possession was
considered an important component of ownership,73 sometimes even
resulting in ownership, 74 and served as a signal of entitlement over an
asset. But it is by no means such an essential ingredient in today's
world.75 In fact, many assets today are not physical, and entities own
them nonetheless. Physically holding property as a sign of entitlement
does not appear to be as important as it once was. As such, it does not
support the claim that there is something unique about the creditor
holding property compared to a creditor who does not. That by itself
does not give any justification for the privilege. 76
Additionally, the possession of property by the possessory lien cred-
itor used to serve as a means to publicize the entitlement the creditor
has over the asset.77 The notion was that other creditors will know of
his holding of the property and will take that into account while deal-
ing with the debtor. But this has also changed in the modern world.
In many cases, creditors will not know whether the asset is still in the
debtor's possession or if it is now held by one of the debtor's posses-
sory lien creditors. Parties do not necessarily enter into transactions
73. See Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221 (1979); Car-
ole M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (1985). Possession can
also result in perfecting a security interest. See U.C.C. § 9-305 (1977); John H. Wigmore, The
Pledge-Idea: A Study in Comparative Legal Ideas, 10 HARV. L. REV. 321, 389 (1897); see also
RICHARD WHITAKER, A TREATISE OF THE LAw RELATIVE TO THE RIGHTS OF LIEN AND STOP-
PAGE IN TRANSITU 2 (photo. reprint 2012) (1812), available at http://books.google.com/books?
id=-4sOAAAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs-gesummary r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&
f=false.
74. See, e.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (defining possession that will
result in ownership as a clear act that involves a notice to the world and a reward to useful
labor).
75. See Frank R. Kennedy, Statutory Liens in Bankruptcy, 39 MINN. L. REV. 697, 708-11
(1955).
76. See Note, supra note 19, at 975.
77. This probably stems from the same motivation as acquiring an ownership right through
possession that required a clear act, a sufficient notice to the public. See Brumagim v. Bradshaw,
39 Cal. 24 (1870); Note, supra note 19, at 957; see also Rose, supra note 73, at 81 ("Possession as
the basis of property ownership, then, seems to amount to something like yelling loudly enough
to all who may be interested.") (referring to first ownership). For a parallel discussion regarding
the perfection of security interests through possession of the property instead of by filing, see 1
GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 14.1 (1965) ("The basic idea
is that the secured creditor must do something to give effective public notice of his interest.").
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with others that reside in close proximity to them, and so other parties
may not be aware of who currently possesses the asset. Tracking as-
sets and who holds them is much more complicated than it used to be.
This barrier will affect a creditor's ability to understand how a change
in possession will alter his rights.
Furthermore, bear in mind that possessory liens can be created at
any time, thus changing the former set of creditors' entitlements. A
creditor who had a security interest that included the asset now being
held by the possessory lien creditor and who calculated his risks ex
ante based on that might end up losing his advantage. In many cases,
a creditor will not be able to foresee this, and he will be exposed to
the enhanced risk without a chance to protect himself.78
On the other hand, a creditor has the legal option to perfect a secur-
ity interest using possession instead of the more common method of
filing.79 If there is a possibility to gain priority over others using only
possession of the property as a pledge, why wouldn't such a priority
system be just as valid when it comes to the types of liens contem-
plated here? First, it should be clarified that although this Article
does not focus on perfecting security interests through possession, it
also does not claim that the current legal arrangement is necessarily
justifiable. It may very well be that this arrangement should be reex-
amined to address global changes in business culture and practice.
Second, and perhaps more fundamentally, there is an apparent, major
difference between these two methods of receiving priority on a
debtor's property: the initial intent. When it comes to perfection of a
security interest by possession, there is no question that the purpose is
to secure one's claim over a debtor, as well as to gain an advantage
over other creditors. But when it comes to possessory liens, an argu-
ment exists that the creditor did not possess the property in order to
guarantee collecting his debt at a later time. The asset was held either
(1) because the creditor had to physically withhold it to fix or improve
it in some way or (2) because, in some cases, the creditor created it at
the debtor's request. In many cases, the initial motive for possession
was not to gain any priority, and the parties did not explicitly agree to
it. Only after the breach of the contract between the parties did the
creditor use the property as a way to gain an advantage. Therefore, it
78. To note, it is of course possible to include a clause in the agreement between the parties
that requires the debtor to notify the secured creditor of any changes in the debtor's property.
Such clause can even state that the debtor needs the creditor's approval before engaging in any
transaction regarding the property that is not part of the routine use. The disadvantage in that
sort of arrangement is that it will complicate business and impose more costs on the parties
involved.
79. See U.C.C. § 9-302 (1977).
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is much harder to predict and calculate the risks for the other parties
involved, and there is a problem claiming that others publically knew
of the possessory lien.
This Part demonstrated difficulties created by the available justifica-
tions for possessory liens. Part IV will offer a new approach to ex-
amine them.
IV. ESTABLISHING POSSESSORY LIENS ON BETTER
NORMATIVE GROUNDS
A. The Contractual Grounds of Possessory Liens
Part III examined the arguments supporting possessory liens and
whether they were plausible. Supporting these liens based on the
creditor's ability to gain possession of the property seems almost an
arbitrary factor. There is also no reason to believe that recognizing a
creditor's right to take possession of certain property will create effi-
ciency because it will negatively affect other creditors who do not
have the option to obtain possession of the debtor's property while
performing the contract. So even if the risks associated with the trans-
action decrease for the asset holder, they increase for others who will
probably collect a smaller portion of the debt they are owed. This
may result in more costly transactions. The real justification for pos-
sessory liens could only be the agreement between the parties. Thus,
possessory liens will be accepted as a valid right in bankruptcy only
when the possession of the asset by the creditor explicitly results from
the agreement.80 Meaning that it will be considered tenable when the
possessory lien creditor's right to withhold the asset is inseparable
from the economic setting and structure outlined by the parties to the
contract.
When parties contract with each other, there are mutual under-
standings upon which the contract is based. These understandings are
an integral part of the contract itself; they help sustain the delicate
balance between the parties. For a contract to be made, every party
should be willing to risk something of his own, whether talents or as-
80. Indeed, possessory liens are sometimes referred to as established by the agreement be-
tween the parties. The debtor, when transferring his property to the creditor, in order for the
creditor to work on it, impliedly consents to the latter keeping hold of the property in case the
debtor does not fulfill his obligations. See New Britain Real Estate & Title Co. v. Collington, 129
A. 780, 781 (1925); see also Nathan Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34, 37
(1917) ("This is illustrated in the history of possessory liens. The presence or absence of a lien
has come imperceptibly to depend on the implied contract.").
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sets, to receive something else from the other.8 ' Economic analysis
predicts that a contract voluntarily entered into will improve the con-
dition of both of its parties. 82 A party will be willing to release an
asset only when that party believes that releasing the asset will be
worthwhile-when, in exchange, the party will get something that is
more valuable than the released asset. 3 But it is not just about the
value of one asset compared to another. A contract contains many
other features that have a huge effect on a party's willingness to be a
part of the bargain. Other clauses may influence a party almost as
much as the price itself. Primarily, the risks associated with a contract
are also a part of the bargain, something that the party takes into ac-
count before deciding if it wants to go through with the bargain. Mini-
mizing these risks through the contract is obviously an important
component of the give and take process. 84
Take, for example, a contract in which one of the parties agrees to
supply a warranty for his product as part of the sale agreement. Sup-
pose the party providing the warranty breaches it. In that case his
breach will distort the balance between the parties' obligations, giving
the affected party the right to seek contractual remedies. Similarly, in
some circumstances, a party's possession of the debtor's property
while performing the transaction and option to continue holding it un-
til the debt is fulfilled could be an essential ingredient of the transac-
tion. Separating the possessory lien from the rest of the contract's
terms will create an imbalanced agreement-an agreement that does
not reflect the parties' consent.
Founding possessory liens on normative grounds in this manner
may seem insignificant at first. To begin with, many laws already ac-
81. See generally Melvin Aaron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARv. L.
REV. 741 (1982).
82. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Contract Law and Modem Economic Theory, 78 Nw. U. L.
REV. 303 (1983). There are exceptions of course. One example is when there is a market failure
such as monopoly. Another is when one of the parties is not informed, which results in an
imbalance between the parties. The latter problem has led to the development of the unconscio-
nability doctrine, which is intended to handle an imbalance in a commercial setting. See Richard
A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Appraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1975).
83. For that reason, a contract is supposed to achieve, in a perfect world, Pareto superiority, a
situation that is better than the one that took place before its execution. On Pareto superiority,
see generally A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUcriON To LAW AND EcoNomics 7 n.4 (3d
ed. 2003).
84. On the importance of reducing transaction costs in economic theory, see Steven N. S.
Cheung, Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements, 12 J.L.
& ECON. 23 (1969).
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knowledge contractual possessory liens8 5 or equitable liens.86 These
liens are distinguished from statutory liens in which the law grants a
possessory lien to the creditor, usually based on the type of service
rendered. Equitable possessory liens arise when parties agree that
certain property will be held by a party as collateral for a debt owed
by the other.87 The agreement's intent must (1) be explicitly or im-
pliedly clear to create a security agreement and (2) identify the spe-
cific property intended to secure the payment.88
What difference does it make if there is a contractual ground to the
right to withhold property or not? This Article's claim is that, in some
cases, it can make all the difference. The other explanations reviewed
above 89 view possessory liens as something you add to the transaction
only after a breach occurred-something that is external and based on
general features that the transaction has and not on the parties them-
selves. As demonstrated before, these arguments cannot logically es-
tablish the right.90 If the right to continue possessing the property was
initially inseparable from the rest of the contractual terms, meaning it
was one of the terms without which the party would not have signed
the contract, then it should be acknowledged in bankruptcy as well.91
This means that the right is not external to the contract, something
that the law creates regardless of what the parties' intentions and un-
derstandings were, but rather a substantial component of the contract.
Instead of trying to base the right on general grounds, which are diffi-
cult to detect, this Article proposes that courts analyze the specific
contract, the specific parties, and the role the withholding option
85. California law, for example, acknowledges the right of an attorney to a possessory lien
only when it is created by the contract between the parties. See Fletcher v. Davis, 90 P.3d 1216,
1219 (Cal. 2004); Severdia v. Alaimo, 116 Cal. Rptr. 405, 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).
86. These are liens that are acknowledged from justice or fairness rationales and are not de-
pendent on physical possession. Due to their nature, and the fact they are basically created by
the court as an equity remedy, there is no specific law governing their application but, rather, a
case-by-case analysis. See, e.g., Ralph A. Boyer & Barry Kutun, The Equitable Lien in Florida,
20 U. MIAMI L. REV. 731 (1966); Barbara E. Cotton, The Equitable Lien: New Life in an Old
Remedy?, 16 ADVOC. Q. 385 (1994); Note, The Equitable Lien Alternative in Ohio, 44 U. CIN. L.
REV. 265 (1975).
87. See RepublicBank, Lubbock, N.A. v. Daves (In re Daves), 770 F.2d 1363, 1367 (5th Cir.
1985).
88. See In re "Ronfin" Series C Bonds Sec. Interest Litig., 182 F.3d 366, 371 (5th Cir. 1999).
89. See supra Part III(A)-(D).
90. See supra Part III(A)-(D).
91. See DAVID G. EPSTEIN, STEVE H. NICKLES & JAMES J. WHITE, BANKRUPTCY § 8-25, at
628 (1993) ("A security interest is nonpossessory unless the parties have deliberately created a
pledge, that is, it is possessory only if they structured the secured transaction so that the secured
party would hold the collateral.").
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played in that relationship. Thus, the argument presented by this Ar-
ticle is not based in property law but in contract law.
Now, assume that in some relationships, one of the parties can gain
possession of the asset during performance, allowing him to continue
holding it until payment is made as part of the terms of the contract.
In such situations, denying that right will result in changing the terms
of the contract. Under the framework presented, possession is no
longer viewed as a means of completing the contract but as an extra
stage in the contract performance. If the parties agreed, explicitly or
implicitly as a result of custom in the specific market, for example,
that the asset will remain in the possession of the creditor until full
payment by the debtor, then the contract was not complete until that
time. Only in these circumstances can one convincingly claim that the
availability of continued possession was an economic factor that cre-
ated an advantage worth protecting. 92 When the parties made an
agreement in which neither considered that the creditor party would
hold the debtor's property during performance, there is no justifica-
tion for preferring the possessory lien creditor over other creditors
who did not get hold of an asset during the course of the transaction.
If it is not an essential part of the contract to begin with, the assump-
tion that it is economically beneficial to acknowledge it is not entirely
convincing.
Conversely, when holding the property is a part of the contract ne-
gotiations, not acknowledging the possessory lien creditor's right to
hold the property will result in distorting the balance of the bargain as
originally created by the parties. The reason why, in almost all cir-
cumstances, interfering with the contract's terms is considered to be
both economically 93 and morally wrong94 is that such interference pre-
vents the parties from deciding for themselves what will benefit them.
Contracts exist to benefit both parties involved. The obligations of
one party stand against the obligations of the other party, creating
equivalence. Removing just one variable from this equation disrupts
92. In essence, this means protecting the mutuality or equivalence between the parties' obliga-
tions and performance. See Eyal Zamir, The Missing Interest: Restoration of the Contractual
Equivalence, 93 VA. L. REV. 59, 120-23 (2007) (protecting the mutuality between the obliga-
tions, or, according to Zamir, restoring the contractual equivalence helps to give the right incen-
tives to the parties by making them internalize their actions; actions that do not comply with the
contract's terms will result in sustaining the performance by the other party).
93. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW
4 (1979).
94. So is the will theory approach, for example, which views the basis of the contract as driven
by the will and freedom of the parties. It is therefore understandable why the parties must
execute that will as initially intended. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 7-21 (1981).
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the notion that contracts usually produce efficiency. The parties are
forced to change the game for which they signed up.
When viewed in this light, possessory liens do not seem to prefer
one creditor to another per se, but they treat the creditor holding the
property as simply continuing in the regular course of the contract as
the parties agreed. It is not that the possessory lien creditor com-
pleted his obligation and is now seeking to force the debtor to fulfill
his. Rather, neither party has completed the contract; the possessory
lien creditor is actually exercising his contractual right, not his prop-
erty right. The next part discusses the practical implications of Part
IV(A).
B. Possessory Liens and Mutuality of Performance
Contractual relationships entitle the contracting parties to certain
rights. One of these rights is the right of one party to stop performing
the contract, so long as the other party is not performing its obliga-
tions or there is an anticipatory breach.95 This right has been long
recognized in courts96 and in academic literature. 97 It is based on the
notion that a contract consists of mutual obligations, creating a struc-
ture that holds the contract and needing the protections of law. A
contract is viewed as something that the parties created to achieve
something-a goal, a target, or an outcome. If one of the parties does
not behave as required under the contract, and in doing so damages
the possibility of achieving the goals set out by the parties, the other
party has the right to withhold performance of his obligations as well.
This right to withhold performance is meant to restore the balance
that was lost due to the breaching party's behavior.98 The right to
withhold performance is meant to protect the party not in breach from
exposing itself to greater risks, encourage the breaching party to com-
plete its obligations, and, in the end, restore the balance between the
parties. If both parties eventually perform the contract in full, then it
is, of course, the ideal and represents that the equivalence originally
95. On anticipatory breach, including a party's right to sustain performance in case of such
breach, see Henry Winthrop Ballantine, Anticipatory Breach and the Enforcement of Contractual
Duties, 22 MICH. L. REV. 329 (1924).
96. The leading case in this matter is Kingston v. Preston, 98 Eng. Rep. 606 (K.B. 1773). See
also Howard v. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp., 540 F.2d 695 (4th Cir. 1976); Ross v. Harding, 391 P.2d 526
(Wash. 1964); MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCErIS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS 104 (1990) ("[P]rior to Kingston v. Preston, decided by King's Bench in 1773, the law
evidently lacked a constructive conditions doctrine and instead treated the parties' promises as
independently enforceable.").
97. See generally Val D. Ricks, In Defense of Mutuality of Obligation: Why "Both Should be
Bound, or Neither", 78 NEB. L. REV. 491, 525-26 (1999).
98. This methodology was developed greatly by Eyal Zamir. See Zamir, supra note 92, at 68.
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sought by the parties was achieved. If, in the end, the contract is per-
manently breached and thus annulled, then the right of the injured
party to abstain from its performance helped minimize the potential
damage caused by the breaching party's actions.
The right to stop performing the contract, while seemingly intuitive,
is actually not so trivial. In general, a party is expected to fulfill its
obligations according to the contract; otherwise, the contract's goals
are jeopardized. Historically, the parties' obligations were considered
independent unless the parties declared otherwise.99 This historical
approach meant that one party had to continue acting according to the
contract even if the other one did not. There was no connection or
dependability between one obligation and the other. Of course, the
party could seek relief using legal remedies, but until the party not in
breach formally annulled the contract, for example, in a method re-
quired by law, that party had no way to protect itself or to minimize its
damages. Now, instead, the parties' obligations are generally not in-
dependent unless the contract explicitly states otherwise. According
to the constructive conditions doctrine, substantial obligations in the
contract 00 will be referred to as dependent upon each other. This
means that a party has the right to refrain from performing the con-
tract when the other party fails to complete its side of the bargain,
provided that the breach involves a substantial obligation.101
As noted, this doctrine has long been established in contract law
theory and practice.102 In essence, the doctrine reflects the modern
era in which contract interpretation is not limited solely to its lan-
guage103 but takes into account the circumstances and the specific par-
ties.104 This doctrine also complies with the notion that parties should
act in good faith, 0 5 because dependent obligations are meant to de-
crease a party's ability to gain from the bargain without supplying
99. See JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 8 109 n.495 (4th ed. 2001).
100. Meaning those obligations that, if breached, would be considered a material breach. Mi-
nor breaches over things that are insignificant in the contract will not allow a party to stop
performing its obligations. This doctrine is referred to as material breach or substantial perform-
ance. See Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).
101. See CHITTY ON CONTRAcrs §§ 824-826 (24th ed. 1977); see also CHITY ON CONTRACTS
570-71 (27th ed. 1994).
102. See supra notes 96-97.
103. See 13 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRAcrs § 38:11 (4th ed. 1990); see also 1
SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CoNTRACrs 95 (1920).
104. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CALIF. L.
REV. 1743 (2000).
105. See generally Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Per-
form in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REv. 369 (1980); Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of
Good Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982).
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what was agreed to in the contract. This doctrine, therefore, reduces
the incentive of a party to act in bad faith.
Next, this Article examines the circumstances in which the issue of
possessory liens' priority arises, most frequently when the creditor ful-
filled a substantial part of its obligations and the debtor did not fulfill
its obligations. The creditor's last obligation is to release the debtor's
asset from the creditor's possession and return it to the debtor. A
reasonable assumption exists that if the creditor releases the debtor's
asset from its possession, then the debtor has no incentive to fully
complete its obligation. It is indeed recognized by law, on quite solid
grounds, that the creditor is not obliged to continue completing its
obligation when the debtor does not fulfill its own obligations. In
most of these cases, the benefit that the debtor denies the creditor
results in a material breach. Usually, the obligation that the debtor
fails to fulfill is one of the most substantial obligations in the contract:
the agreed payment.
Therefore, the creditor's right to withhold the property is morally
and economically justifiable. Such a right represents the current view
with regards to the contracting parties' relationship, according to
which they aim to create value through the contract and rely on each
other's performance to achieve that value. Complying with the con-
tract's terms is required when compliance promotes the mutual goal
of the contracting parties. But when it results in deviations from the
parties' mutual goals, compliance can no longer be required.
Withholding a debtor's asset is thus a contractual right, founded on
contractual logic and reasoning. As opposed to the property argu-
ments reviewed before, the contractual right argument does not falter
due to inconsistencies with other legal doctrines. On the contrary, the
contractual right argument complies with the general understanding
regarding a contract party's right during the contract performance.
This argument corresponds with the true nature of the bargain and
does not assume a priori that the transaction has certain features that
it may not have. This right is relevant and justifiable only when it
results directly from the contract itself. Therefore, the contractual
right argument will not apply where the party gained possession of the
asset coincidently and not as part of the consented structure of future
performance and obligations. Viewing a creditor's right to withhold a
debtor's asset as such eliminates the problem, noted before, that may
arise in the current legal arrangement, which creates a random prefer-
ence without establishing it on either solid economic or moral
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grounds.106 When the law protects the agreement, as well as the un-
derstandings and expectations of the parties, it gives security and cer-
tainty to the parties, which can enhance efficiency by minimizing
transaction costs and securing the benefit of the bargain as set by the
parties. 07
V. CONTRACr-BASED POSSESSORY LIENS AND
BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS
A. Understanding the Problem
Part IV focused on establishing possessory liens on more convincing
grounds, such as their compatibility with the principles of contract
law. The question still remains, however, regarding the appropriate
priority of a possessory lien creditor among the other creditors. Will
this creditor be favored and allowed to hold the asset until the debtor
makes payment? Or, should this right be ignored once the debtor is
insolvent?
Generally, rights are neither annulled nor cancelled, but bankruptcy
has a tendency to change the game. In bankruptcy, rights are fre-
quently ignored or dismissed in favor of other goals, which may in-
clude satisfying the claims of other creditors. Bankruptcy law
assumes, though perhaps not explicitly, that certain rights will not be
fulfilled. 08 This assumption is evident in a situation where the debtor
is insolvent, meaning that either (1) the debtor cannot meet his obliga-
tions when they become due or (2) the debtor's total liabilities exceed
his total assets. Although every creditor has a right to be repaid, there
will always be creditors who will not receive the full amount of their
claims in bankruptcy simply because the debtor does not have enough
assets.109 The crucial question then becomes what standards decide
106. See supra Part III.
107. This complies with the ex ante goal of bankruptcy law to minimize the costs of credit.
108. On the impact of bankruptcy on contract law, see, for example, Charles J. Tabb, Of Con-
tractarians and Bankruptcy Reform: A Skeptical View, 12 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 259, 268
(2004) ("Almost by definition, bankruptcy and insolvency implicate market failures and market
distortions for the debtor firms.. .. Freedom of contract does not work well in such a setting,
viewed ex ante. Instead, ex post sorting promises a more effective and coherent resolution. . . .
[Dieference to contractual regimes only is appropriate if the risks and benefits being allocated in
the contract are internalized to the contracting parties. This condition often is not satisfied in
bankruptcy.").
109. Research shows that the percentage of payment towards unsecured creditors is very low.
See Lynn M. LoPucki, A General Theory of the Dynamics of the State Remedies/Bankruptcy
System, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 311, 311 (showing that unsecured creditors receive approximately
30% of the money they are owed in reorganization procedures, while in liquidation they receive
less than 5%, and in 80% of the cases they do not get anything at all); Lynn M. LoPucki &
William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of
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who should be repaid and in what amount. As a general rule, credi-
tors are paid equally in bankruptcy,110 but that gives only part of the
picture. In reality, there is a scale of priority according to the type of
creditor or the type of debt; some creditors will get more than others.
Founding possessory liens on the contractual relationship between
the parties necessitates an examination of the way contracts are han-
dled in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy law dedicates a unique arrangement
to contracts in bankruptcy proceedings. Section 365 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code specifies two ways of dealing with executory contracts in
bankruptcy."1 The first is choosing to reject the contract, meaning de
facto annulment. The second is assuming a contract, i.e. enforcing its
performance on both parties.112 Those are the only ways to decide a
contract's fate once one of the parties declares bankruptcy. The deci-
sion to assume or reject a contract is made solely by the debtor-in-
possession or the bankruptcy trustee. As opposed to the regularly ap-
plied contract law, these rights can be exercised by only one of the
parties to the contract. Furthermore, in many circumstances, the
party exercising the right to annul or enforce the contract is the
breaching, insolvent party. Contractual rights do not remain as they
are in bankruptcy. Other interests-perhaps broader ones as some
suggest-influence the option to seek these rights. The next step is to
investigate the motives to limit the contractual rights of the parties
and whether such limitations apply to a creditor's right to withhold a
debtor's asset.
A debtor's decision to assume or reject the contract should ideally
be based on economic considerations. If performing the contract will
negatively affect the debtor's financial condition, the Bankruptcy
Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 142 (1990) (showing that, in reorgani-
zation of a large, publicly held corporation, the average return is 50%); Michelle J. White, Bank-
ruptcy Liquidation and Reorganization, in HANDBOOK OF MODERN FINANCE 37-1, 37-39
(Dennis E. Logue ed., 2d ed. 1990) (stating that the average return in liquidation of small firms is
around 4%).
110. See, e.g., John C. McCoid, II, Bankruptcy, Preferences, and Efficiency: An Expression of
Doubt, 67 VA. L. REV. 249, 260 (1981) ("From the creditor's standpoint, bankruptcy's principal
theme is equality, or ratable distribution of the debtor's assets, among unsecured creditors.").
111. The term "executory contract" is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code. The most com-
monly-used definition was suggested by Countryman. See Vern Countryman, Executory Con-
tracts in Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57 MINN. L. REv. 439, 460 (1973) ("[A] contract under which the
obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that
the failure of either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the
performance of the other.").
112. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2006). At one point it was recommended to replace "reject" with
"election to breach" and "assume" with "election to perform." See Nat'l Bankr. Review
Comm'n, Report of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission, Oct. 20, 1997, at 459-65.
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Code gives the debtor a way out by rejecting the contract.113 This
privilege derives from the understanding that if the debtor continues
engaging in relationships that are not financially efficient, the debtor
will eventually worsen the state of the creditors. Financially ineffi-
cient relationships may also negatively affect the debtor's reorganiza-
tion efforts. The debtor can choose to reject the contract even if the
he has already breached it. Instead, the debtor will choose to assume
a contract when its performance yields positive outcomes that will im-
prove the debtor's ability to repay the debts owed to the creditors by
enlarging the pool of assets available for distribution. 114
The current legal arrangement, as described here, expresses some-
thing crucial to understanding the connection between contracts and
bankruptcy. In essence, the law is willing to accept that the solvent
party will be denied the ability to execute its regular rights except for
those granted in bankruptcy. Although the law does not explicitly
state this, one of the parties has more rights available to it than the
other. The balance that contract law intends to achieve does not have
the same force once a party has declared bankruptcy. This is espe-
cially true as far as contractual remedies are concerned. One party
can inflict its preferences on the other while the latter cannot do much
about it. The question that now remains is, if the motives for posses-
sory lien's preference are contract based, whether the debtor can rea-
sonably be denied the right to decide the enforceability of the
contract.
Presumably, in the case of the right to withhold an asset, the debtor
should be given the choice to decide whether it wants the contract to
be continued or discontinued. If the contract benefits the estate, then
the debtor will choose to assume the contract and, consequently, bear
all contractual obligations 15 : most important, the payment due for the
service rendered. Conversely, if performance of the contract creates a
loss for the debtor, then the debtor will choose to reject it. Applying
the executory contracts arrangement in bankruptcy to the case of con-
tract-based possessory entitlements, the result is that the possessory
lien creditor will not be able to continue holding the asset unless the
113. See Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding 'Rejection',
59 U. COLo. L. REV. 845, 895-96 (1988); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of
Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REV. 227, 249-51 (1989).
114. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Protecting the Fundamen-
tal Terms of the Bargain, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 507, 513 (1983).
115. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1). The debtor will need to cure past defaults as well as guarantee
future performance. This has been the legal arrangement in the United States long before the
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978. See, e.g., Conway v. White, 9 F.2d 863, 871 (2d Cir.
1925).
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debtor assumes the contract. In that case, the possessory lien creditor
will be able to continue holding the debtor's asset until the debtor
makes full payment. Otherwise, once the debtor rejects the contract,
the contract is annulled and the principle of restitution is applied to
both parties. 116 To begin, each party will have to return what it re-
ceived during the contract's performance. This means the solvent
party is obliged to return the asset. The creditor's claim against the
debtor-whether it includes expectation damages or reliance dam-
ages-will be fulfilled, in part, when the debtor's assets are distrib-
uted. Most of the contractual creditors are unsecured, which means
the possessory lien creditor will receive its share under the pro rata
distribution rule.117 Thus, the possessory lien creditor's claim will be
handled in the same manner as any other claim of a creditor with a
rejected contract.
There is one crucial problem with this solution. In many circum-
stances there is no possibility that the debtor will choose to assume a
contract under such legal arrangement because, in most cases, the pos-
sessory lien creditor has already rendered services according to their
agreement. The only obligation left for the possessory lien creditor is
to return the asset to its owner. Why would a debtor not choose to
reject a contract in such circumstances? The debtor has no incentive
to assume the contract once the creditor substantially completes his
obligation. The debtor's assumption of the contract will lead him only
to spend additional money and will not provide him much in return, as
the creditor already satisfied his obligations.
The circumstances of the possessory lien creditor holding the asset
should be divided into two categories for analysis: (1) when the asset
was created by the creditor and (2) when the property was owned by
the debtor before the parties' agreement. In the first category, the
debtor arguably does not own the asset until payment is made. In
many of these contracts, the transfer of the asset to the debtor occurs
simultaneously with the debtor's payment for the service or shortly
thereafter. Until that point in time, the asset is not considered the
property of the debtor. Rejecting the contract may therefore prevent
the asset from being transferred to the debtor because it was not his in
the first place. Because rejecting the contract amounts to an annul-
ment, the parties should remain as though the contract was never
signed. Thus, each party should receive only restitution upon the
116. On restitution see, for example, Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitu-
tion, 67 TEx. L. REV. 1277 (1989).
117. Usually leaving the creditor, as noted before, without much to collect from the debtor at
the end of the proceeding. See supra note 109.
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debtor's rejection of the contract. The result is that the breaching
party returns the benefit conferred upon it by the party not in breach
and vice versa.118
When the possessory lien creditor created the asset on behalf of the
debtor, the law governing executory contracts should apply quite eas-
ily. Should the debtor wish to retain possession and ownership of the
product, the debtor can choose to assume the contract and its terms.
The possessory lien creditor will deliver the asset to the debtor and, in
return, will receive the agreed payment. If performing the contract
will yield no positive outcome for the debtor, then the debtor can
choose to reject it and, consequently, will not be obligated to pay for
the service rendered at that time; instead, the debtor must pay certain
creditors on a pro rata basis after the rest of the debts are repaid. By
assuming the contract, the debtor does not prefer the possessory lien
creditor to other creditors. Rather, the creditor is treated in the same
manner as other creditors. If continued performance will benefit the
estate, the possessory lien creditor will be repaid prior to other credi-
tors, and if continued performance will not benefit the estate, then the
possessory lien creditor will not be repaid before other creditors.
The second category, in which this problem arises, is when the prop-
erty was owned by the debtor before the parties' agreement. What
should the result be when the debtor assumes or rejects the contract?
If the debtor rejects the contract, then the remedy of restitution ap-
plies. According to this principle, every party to the contract should
be returned to its pre-contractual condition. Thus, the asset should
presumably return to its owner, the debtor. Assuming the contract
yields the same result, the debtor gets the asset and must pay what he
owed according to the contract. This leads to the problem pointed out
before that if there is no difference from the debtor's point of view
regarding what the debtor gains by assuming the contract, as opposed
to rejecting it, what is the debtor's incentive to assume the contract?
Assuming the contract not only gives the debtor the benefit of the
bargain but also requires the debtor to provide something in return.
In this case, the debtor's rejection gives him the benefit of the bargain
with a legal authorization, which essentially means the debtor is not
obliged to compensate the possessory lien creditor in full. Is there
even competition between assuming and rejecting the contract from
the debtor's point of view?
118. The purpose of the restitution interest is to prevent unjust enrichment to any of the
parties. On the connection between the two, see, for example, JACK BEATSON, THE USE AND
ABUSE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT (1991); Emily Sherwin, Restitution and Equity: An Analysis of
the Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 79 TEx. L. REV. 2083 (2001).
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The legal arrangement described appears defective, which is how
this Article differentiates these types of transactions from others. It is
a situation where there is no incentive to assume the contract. Or
rather, it is a situation where the application of the standard rules re-
garding contracts in bankruptcy does not yield the desired results.
The rules as they are cannot promote efficiency as they do not en-
courage the debtor to act in an efficient way. This derives from the
imbalanced position the contract was in when bankruptcy occurred.
Although neither party fulfilled its obligations in full, a significant gap
between the parties' performance existed. The creditor completed the
services that the debtor originally desired while the debtor did not
complete his obligations to the creditor.119
One can argue that the debtor should not receive the asset in order
to restore the balance between the parties, but this will not produce
the optimal outcome either. In this scenario, the risk of unjust enrich-
ment goes both ways. On the one hand, the collateral is the debtor's
property, so it makes sense to give it back to the debtor, whether or
not the parties performed the contract. Otherwise, the possessory lien
creditor will be unjustly enriched.120 On the other hand, if the asset is
handed out to the debtor, then the debtor receives extra value, value
that belongs to the creditor.
In many executory contracts, the debtor unjustly receives value.
The difference between regular executory contracts and the scenarios
referred to here is two-fold. First, in the circumstances described,
there is no way that the debtor will prefer to assume the contract,
even if, viewed aggregately, the debtor's assumption is the preferred
decision based purely on economic grounds. The debtor may benefit
from rejecting the contract, but the loss or damage imposed on the
possessory lien creditor might be greater than the debtor's benefit,
thus producing an aggregate loss. Second, while in other circum-
stances the possessory lien creditor already gave value to the debtor
before the commencement of the case, here, supposedly, no value was
transferred until the asset itself was transferred. If the law allows for
the transfer of the asset back to the debtor, then it essentially autho-
rizes damaging the possessory lien creditor because the harm does not
exist until the creditor actually gives up, legally or voluntarily, posses-
sion of the asset. Holding the asset has a value, and the possessory
lien creditor realizes that value by depriving the debtor of his contrac-
tual rights until the debtor's obligations are fulfilled. Preventing the
119. See supra note 111 (discussing the definition of executory contracts).
120. This is true unless the value of the service provided by the creditor is higher than the
value of the property itself. But that is a rare situation.
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creditor from holding the asset imposes a premature loss upon the
creditor, which changes the pre-bankruptcy financial state of the par-
ties. Part V(B) offers a way out of this complex dilemma.
B. The Appropriate Legal Arrangement
Part V(A) previously described the difficulty that arises where a
party takes possession of the other party's property as an inseparable
component of a contract's structure. Holding the property in such a
manner should be viewed as a contractual right when it is based on
contractual consents. But this contract-based view offers neither a so-
lution to the question of whether the possessory lien creditor is enti-
tled to hold the asset nor an answer concerning the scope of that right
if it indeed exists. This scenario directs us towards the legal arrange-
ment of executory contracts, but this arrangement cannot enhance
contractual efficiency. It does not offer a solution to a situation where
there is an imbalance between the parties' obligations at the time the
decision regarding the contract is made. It is also characterized by
forcing the possessory lien creditor to worsen its financial position
compared to the one it had when the proceedings began.
This last characteristic is an important one, since it is not typical
under bankruptcy law. Usually, the law assumes the debtor created
the loss prior to bankruptcy, whereas now the law's goal is to
straighten things out. Bankruptcy law is not supposed to decrease a
creditor's return or to force a creditor to risk his assets to help the
debtor. When a creditor risks his assets in bankruptcy, he is usually
compensated for that by receiving a higher priority in the distribution
process. This principle should also be applied to a possessory lien
creditor who holds an asset that the debtor wishes to retrieve. How-
ever, the debtor does not gain any benefit while it is still in the posses-
sion of the creditor. Therefore, transferring the asset is not only a
physical transfer but also a value-creating transfer of the possessory
lien creditor.
One can criticize this approach by saying it goes back to the earlier
examined and dismissed approach that justifies possessory liens be-
cause the creditor enhanced the asset's value on behalf of the debtor,
but this approach is different. It does not rely on the value enhance-
ment created for the debtor as a rationale. It focuses on the value of
withholding the asset for the creditor based on the contract between
the parties, as well as that in such cases there is difficulty in imple-
menting bankruptcy law. The goal is thus to create a legal arrange-
ment that requires the debtor to internalize the costs inflicted on the
possessory lien creditor if the debtor chooses to repossess the asset.
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Ranking the possessory lien creditor as a preferred, though un-
secured, is a solution that seems to correspond with the basis of the
right and the problems arising from it. This solution forces the posses-
sory lien creditor to release the asset, giving the creditor a priority that
reflects a goal to continue business with the debtor after the debtor
has filed for bankruptcy protection.121 Unlike a secured creditor, the
possessory lien creditor will neither be repaid before all of the other
creditors 22 nor have any of the rights designated to secured credi-
tors.123 The possessory lien creditor will be referred to as a contrac-
tual creditor, a creditor with whom the debtor chose to continue its
business based on economic grounds.
If the debtor chooses not to assume the contract, the contractual
creditor will be obligated to return value equal to the market value of
the asset before the creditor's improvements. If possible, on both a
practical and an economic level, the contractual creditor can also re-
move the improvements and return the asset in its original condition.
The contractual creditor, like the debtor, is not entitled to earn profits
that do not belong to him in the first place. Therefore, if the debtor
chooses not to assume the contract, the creditor will not be obligated
to return the improved asset but will have to comply with the principle
of restitutionl 24 and return its value. Under this arrangement, neither
party unjustly gains value that belongs to the other party. The debtor
is not entitled to take the asset as part of restitution, and the contrac-
tual creditor is not entitled to claim the entire asset's value but rather
only the value of the improvements made.
Such a legal arrangement succeeds in achieving several important
goals. First, it prevents the debtor from externalizing the costs associ-
ated with the contractual relationship to the creditor, which would re-
sult in inefficient bargaining.125 Second, it gives the debtor a chance
121. 11 U.S.C. § 726 (2006) (stating that the first items to be paid after secured claims were
satisfied are expenses and claims with priority according to § 507 of the Bankruptcy Code).
122. The trustee distributes the estate to satisfy secured claims first. Only then do the other
creditors start to get repaid, according to § 726 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. This is also known
as the absolute priority rule.
123. These rights include receiving relief from the automatic stay under § 362(d) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. Id. § 362(d). The solvent party will not be considered as a creditor with an interest
in the property because this is a contract-based relationship in which no security interest was
created on behalf of the creditor. When holding a possessory lien under current law, the creditor
is exempt from the scope of the automatic stay and is not considered to be in violation of the stay
if the creditor maintains possession over the property. See, e.g., Hayden v. Wells (In re Hayden),
308 B.R. 428 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004); Boggan v. Hoff Ford, Inc. (In re Boggan), 251 B.R. 95
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000).
124. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
125. Judge Posner suggested a definition of a state of externalization. See RICHARD A. Pos-
NER, EcONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAw 49-55 (4th ed. 1992) ("[T]he resolution of the dispute affects
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to earn the benefit of the bargain without forcing the debtor to simul-
taneously pay the contractual creditor when assuming the contract.
Requiring the debtor to pay the contractual creditor at the initial stage
might be difficult on a practical level and may prevent the debtor from
being able to afford to assume the contract at all. Allowing the debtor
to pay later, when the debtor pays his other creditors, will be easier
and will enable the debtor to smoothly pay off his debt under the reor-
ganization plan. Third, this solution represents, as this Article argues,
the true debtor-creditor relationship. It is a contractual relationship
and should be treated as such under bankruptcy law. This is the cor-
rect framework, and it corresponds with other legal arrangements in
bankruptcy law, creating a coherent system. Fourth, the solution
shifts the decision to assume or reject the contract, or transfer the as-
set, from the creditor to the debtor, as it should once the debtor has
entered bankruptcy. The solution provides the debtor with more con-
trol and allows the debtor's relationships and their outcomes to be
examined from an efficiency point of view, accounting for the impact
on all the debtor's creditors and the bankruptcy proceeding as a
whole.
VI. CONCLUSION
The case of possessory liens is intriguing on a theoretical and a prac-
tical level. So far, academic literature does not offer convincing expla-
nations for the priority given to a possessory lien creditor or his legal
arrangement with a debtor as a whole. This Article has examined the
issue of possessory liens and explained the problems with current ar-
guments favoring its legal arrangement while offering an innovative
approach. Viewing possessory liens as an inherent part of contract
law provides a different perspective for analysis. The analysis this Ar-
ticle suggests corresponds with other procedures and issues that arise
in bankruptcy and leads to a legal arrangement that is more logically
sound than other analyses. Thus, this approach is theoretically inno-
vative and produces practical legal applications.
a third party, and the third party has no opportunity to affect the outcome .... ). For a current
demonstration of how externalities can negatively influence parties' behavior in a contractual
setting when third parties are involved, see Dov Solomon & Odelia Minnes, Non-Recourse, No
Down Payment and the Mortgage Meltdown: Lessons from Undercapitalization, 16 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 529 (2011).
1132012]

